The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides for a variety of reasons to take leave. Of course, leave for the employee’s own debilitating illness or injury is among them. Leave time typically includes time for treatment and for recovery. Upon returning from leave, the employee must be returned to the same or substantially similar job. Most FMLA lawsuits are not about return to work conditions because the rules are simple to understand and follow. Even so, the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided such a case. Although the Seventh Circuit does not have jurisdiction in Texas, federal courts from other jurisdictions often give us insights into how our own courts might decide a similar case.
Carris James had medical problems that affected his work in the banquet group at Hyatt Regency Chicago. He missed some time due to health issues, so Hyatt sent him FMLA leave paperwork. His leave was approved for twelve weeks. At the end of twelve weeks, James’ leave was extended as permitted by his union contract. James was not permitted to return to work because his medical documentation stated either that he could not work in any capacity (and needed disability benefits) or that his impairments prevented him from performing essential functions of his job. Finally, about seven months after his FMLA leave expired, James returned to work in the same job in all respects (pay, shift, seniority, etc.).
James sued, asserting Hyatt retaliated against him and interfered with his FMLA rights by failing to return him to work promptly after twelve weeks. The Court considered James’ own documentation and held that an employer has no duty to return an employee to work who cannot perform the essential functions of his or her job. The Court went on to say that there is no such thing as “light duty” under FMLA: the law only gives a right to time off. Although that is good news for employers, we should remember that employees returning or attempting to return to work after FMLA leave may be covered under the Americans with Disabilities act. But here, there was no reasonable accommodation for James’ condition that would allow him to return after twelve weeks.